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The Shadow Economy: Challenges
to Economic and Social Policy
Mihail Arandarenko
2.1 Features of the Shadow Economy
The shadow economy is a multi-dimensional, multi-faceted phenomenon, which
inevitably accompanies formal economies throughout the world. However, its
characteristics and dimensions can be vastly different: from relatively benign,
stable, and acceptable to extremely destructive to the economic tissue and long-
term economic growth. In countries where shadow economies are present to a large
extent or where they show upward trends, these informal sectors are invariably a
symptom of deeper disturbances in the economic structure, regulation, and
institutions.
In an environment dominated by the economic crisis—present in Serbia since
2008 both statistically and, particularly, in the public’s perception—the need to
deeply understand the shadow economy and find ways to reduce it through
formalisation grows acute. In times of crisis it becomes more apparent that the
shadow economy can be not only a consequence but also a cause of greater decline
in the gross domestic product, and can spread the crisis further. The shadow
economy becomes part of a vicious circle where one of the consequences of
recession is flight from formal to shadow trading, which reduces tax revenue,
thus increasing the fiscal deficit. The growing deficit must, in turn, be compensated
for by higher tax rates: higher taxes drive more companies and workers into the
shadow economy, or, even more devastatingly, out of the economy altogether. This
downward spiral keeps repeating itself, always at a lower level of GDP and
employment. The empirical mechanisms behind this vicious circle are complex,
and include the impact of inflation, declining real wages, and growing unemploy-
ment on the increase of the informal economy, and vice versa.
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On the other hand, in an abstract economic context the shadow economy can be
viewed as a specific market ‘anti-institution’. In this light it can be claimed that the
shadow economy can eliminate tax and other wedges that institutions create
between labour supply and labour demand or product supply and product demand,
thereby creating employment or products that would otherwise not have been
created, and extending the cost-effectiveness margin for both individuals and
businesses.
In a hypothetical market free of taxes and other costs associated with the running
of institutions, all economic activity is ‘in the shadow’. In reality, formal and
informal economies exist in parallel, which introduces distortions and allocates
resources sub-optimally. Schneider and Enste (2000) underline the ambivalence of
the effects of the shadow economy on the formal economy. On the one hand, the
informal economy leads to allocation distortions because resources and production
factors are not used as efficiently as possible. On the other hand, income generated
in the shadow economy is mainly spent in the formal economy (as much as three-
quarters, according to surveys carried out in Germany), which has a stimulating
effect on it.
In order to be efficient, measures designed to foster the formalisation of the
shadow economy have to be based on knowledge of the causes and structure of
informal activity. A particular problem in designing these measures is that infor-
mation about the shadow economy is necessarily unreliable and incomplete. Fur-
ther, the shadow economy is inherently very heterogeneous, while economic policy
measures, to be implementable in practice, should be simple and, in the main,
universally applicable—at any rate, less selective than is desirable from the point of
view of optimal targeting.
From the standpoint of economic and social effects, and given the need to
develop a formalisation strategy for the shadow economy, it is very important to
have a clear perspective of the dominant character of the shadow economy in any
particular country and to know whether it is primarily a consequence of voluntary
or forced exit, or of exclusion. Voluntary exit means that particular individuals,
with specific preferences and mind-sets (say, strong individualists or people more
likely to take risks), decide to engage in economic activity outside of the formal
economy, even though they are able to find employment in the formal sector.
Voluntary exit from the formal economy with the aim of maximising profits or
personal income can be reinforced by inadequate penal policy or the lack of
implementation of legal sanctions. Forced exit means that individuals or firms are
pressured to leave the formal economy due to their own failure in the market,
negative trends in the business environment, or rigid regulation. For these entities
the shadow economy is the last resort. Exclusion means that certain individuals or
groups have never been part of the formal economy, nor have ever had any realistic
opportunity to join it.
The two main groups of entities engaged in the shadow economy are businesses
and the population. ‘Diagnosing’ the shadow economy, as a precondition for
successfully tackling it, entails answering many specific structural questions that
relate to both of these large groups of stakeholders. It is important to learn more
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about the levels of education and human capital of the segments of the population
that participate in the shadow economy, as well as their geographical distribution
and structure by type of locality (urban/rural population), structure by age, gender,
and social status, the average amount and distribution of wages in the shadow
economy, and working hours and modes of employment (primary vs. secondary or
supplementary).
Detailed structural information is also needed on businesses and entrepreneurs.
These include both basic data (total revenue, profit, number of employees, industry,
registration status, etc.) and information on participation in the shadow economy,
ranging from evasion of taxes and other dues payable to the state, to
non-compliance with regulations and standards that entail expenses.
More information is available on the participation of the population in the
Serbian shadow economy than on businesses, owing to regular semi-annual Labour
Force Surveys carried out by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. The
survey implemented in this study, aimed primarily at businesses and entrepreneurs,
will therefore fill a major void in the available knowledge base for pursuing
evidence-based economic and social policies designed to formalise the shadow
economy.
2.2 Brief History of the Shadow Economy in Serbia
Over the last quarter of a century Serbia’s economy has undergone tectonic
changes. In the late 1980s the economic system was still based on socialist self-
management, rooted in self-managing socially owned businesses. There was a
shadow economy, but it was confined to the then-small private sector and house-
holds, mainly in agriculture and through supplementary work. This situation
underwent fundamental change from the early 1990s as the federal state
disintegrated: business legislation was amended in the ‘first transition’ while initial
privatisation took place; hyperinflation ravaged the country between 1992 and
1994; international sanctions were introduced in 1992—with Serbia virtually living
in a state of war. All of these factors contributed to the creation of a lawless business
environment in which the shadow economy flourished. In the 1990s even the central
authorities operated informally in many important aspects of the economy such as
customs and foreign trade. The parallel existence of private, social, and state
property stimulated a great deal of abuse. Faced with loss of income or even
property, households turned in large numbers to the shadow economy as their
primary or supplementary source of income. Workers, although generally retaining
formal jobs, nonetheless lost reasonable or indeed any wages, and supplemented
them by finding employment in the shadow economy. Many businesses also turned
to the shadow economy, with socially owned companies largely evading the
payment of payroll taxes, while the newly established private firms often evaded
taxes and failed to declare their employees. Parallel trade in consumer goods,
particularly those subject to excise duty, reached extreme levels.
2 The Shadow Economy: Challenges to Economic and Social Policy 7
Estimates of the extent of the shadow economy in the 1990s on the one hand
show extremely high levels and on the other substantial volatility. The halting of
hyperinflation in 1994 and the removal of most of the sanctions imposed by the
international community resulted in a drop in the volume of the informal economy
after the 1993 peak when the share of the shadow economy reached 54.4 % of GDP.
In 1995 this figure declined to 40.8 %, and fell again to 34.5 % in 1997 (Krstic´
et al. 1998). In all likelihood the relative size of the shadow economy grew again
after the bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999.
Macroeconomic stabilisation and economic reforms, including European inte-
gration, begun after the ousting of the Milosˇevic´ regime in 2000, had been expected
to bring about a quick decline in the extent of the shadow economy. This, however,
failed to materialise, both in terms of the reduction seen and the time it took for
improvements to take place. There are several potential explanations for this.
Firstly, the period after 2000 was marked by accelerating transition, including
mass privatisation and restructuring, which introduced additional instability. Sec-
ondly, there are strong arguments in favour of the claim that inappropriate taxation
policy, particularly in the field of labour taxation,1 incentivised flight into the
informal sector rather than the formalisation of businesses and employment. Fur-
ther, inefficient and selective law enforcement was the hallmark of this entire
period, which again failed to create sufficient incentives for entities to leave the
shadow economy.
Yet it cannot be disputed that the 2000s saw changes in the relative size and
character of the shadow economy. The development of the shadow economy over
the last decade has been studied more extensively from the point of view of
households than from that of businesses. It can be monitored through the three
waves of the Living Standards Measurement Study (2002, 2003, 2007) and, since
2008, through semi-annual Labour Force Surveys as well.
Informal employment can be defined in various ways. Basically, people working
without formal contracts and unable to exercise their social insurance rights are
employed informally. They may work for a wage, be self-employed, or work as
helping members of households—with this last category being informal by
definition.
Krstic´ and Sanfey (2011) compared data on informal employment obtained from
the Living Standards Measurement Survey at two points in time, 2002 and 2007,
which correspond to the early and mature phase, respectively, of Serbia’s post-2000
transition. By their own admission, they obtained counterintuitive results that
indicate that the level of informal employment increased significantly over those
5 years, from 28 % of total employment in 2002 to 35 % in 2007. Secondly, they
also found that the informal nature of employment was a significant determinant of
inequality in 2007, but not so in 2002—in other words, transition saw a ‘dipping’ of
1 This primarily refers to the very high tax burden at low wage levels, which resulted in very high
average and marginal tax rates for the minimum wage, the natural point of entry into the formal
economy. This issue will be dealt with in greater detail in Chap. 3.
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informal employment towards the bottom of the wage distribution, in parallel with
the growth in its volume. Thus the authors found that informal workers earned less
than formal workers in monthly net amounts, even when all other characteristics
were controlled for. In an endeavour to discover the potential causes of the increase
in informal employment and the rise in the advantage enjoyed by the wages of
formal workers, the authors point to the regressive labour taxation system as one of
the likely causes of these unexpected and unfavourable trends.
Although the Labour Force Survey as carried out prior to 2008 did not contain
questions that would enable employment to unambiguously be categorised into one
of two mutually exclusive categories—formal or informal—efforts were made to
estimate informal employment using Labour Force Survey data. Thus, under a
World Bank (2006) classification, the group of those in informal employment
includes: (1) self-employed people without a university degree; (2) all helping
members of households; and (3) salaried employees and owners of private compa-
nies with fewer than ten staff. All salaried employees of state and socially owned
businesses are deemed to be formally employed. According to the definition used in
this World Bank report, Serbia’s informal sector was very large in 2005, comprising
43 % of all those in employment and 27 % of all salaried employees. Although
informal economy is overestimated by the arbitrary inclusion of the micro-business
and entrepreneurs in the informal economy, the structural findings are distinctive
and for the most part convincing, and are also borne out by other analyses. The
study also found that informal employment is linked to low income, poverty, and
vulnerability. Further, there is an above-average share of the young and the
undereducated among those in informal employment. Professional experience and
wages are much lower in the informal than in the formal economy. The wage
premium for those in formal work stood at around 20 %.
Interestingly, data from the 2008 Labour Force Survey show much lower levels
of informal employment than those presented above. Another interesting finding,
available since the Labour Force Survey made it possible to monitor informal
employment, is that informal employment was slower to decline during the crisis.
Thus, as shown in Table 2.1, the share of informal employment in total adult
employment according to the 2008 Labour Force Survey stood at 23 %. This figure
dropped to 21 % in 2009, fell again to 19.6 % in 2010, only to decline yet again to
just 17 % by April 2012.
It should be borne in mind that, under the definition used by the Statistical Office
of the Republic of Serbia, informal employment includes: (1) workers at
unregistered privately held companies; (2) workers at registered companies
employed without a written contract and without paid social insurance contribu-
tions; and (3) helping family members. Krstic´ (2012) uses a more standard defini-
tion, which also includes workers employed under a written contract but without
paid contributions. Consequently, this study found greater rates of informal
employment, as shown in Table 2.2.
A finding of this study, which is both interesting and difficult to explain, is the
substantial decline in informal work seen since the start of this crisis. It does not fit
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into the standard assumption of the counter-cyclical or at least ambivalent character
of informal employment.
A newer comparative study carried out by the International Labour Organisation
(ILO 2011) found that Serbia had the lowest level of non-agricultural informal
employment among a group of 44 mostly middle- and lower-income countries.
Data for Serbia were collected using the Labour Force Survey, which, it was
recently claimed, has categorisation issues that probably make it underestimate
the actual number of those in informal employment (Krstic´ 2012). Nevertheless, the
conclusion that the level of non-agricultural informal employment in Serbia is
lower than would be expected based on its GDP is certainly valid—placing Serbia
among countries with relatively low levels of non-agricultural informal employ-
ment (ILO 2011).
Be that as it may, research into the informal economy from the population
standpoint undoubtedly shows that the informal sector has substantially changed
in character over the last decade. Let us note that the standard theoretical explana-
tion for informal employment (at least for salaried employment) is that both the
employee and the employer have an interest in splitting the ‘excess’ that appears
when the payment of social contributions is evaded. In this context, an informal
wage is greater than a salary in addition to which contributions must be paid, but, in
terms of total labour costs, it is lower than the total labour costs of a formal salary.
While at the beginning of the decade the informal sector, obviously taking its cue
from the disorderly 1990s, comprised employees with widely varying and not
necessarily inferior characteristics, who did not earn less than their formal coun-
terparts (see, for instance, the findings of Lokshin and Jovanovic´ 2003), by the end
Table 2.1 Serbia: Labour market and informal employment indicators, 2006–2012
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Participation rate (%) 63.6 63.4 62.7 60.6 59.0 59.9 59.7
Employment rate (%) 49.8 51.5 53.7 50.4 47.2 45.3 44.2
Unemployment rate (%) 21.6 18.8 14.4 16.9 20.0 24.4 26.1
Informal employment (in % of population
aged 15 years and over)
– – 23.0 20.6 19.6 17.8 17.0
Source: Labour Force Survey, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia







Informal employment (in % of total employment,
15+)
25.8 25.1 24.1
Informal employment (in % of total employment,
15–64)
23.1 22.5 21.8
Informal employment outside agriculture 9.2 9.5 8.5
Source: Krstic´ (2012); Estimates based on panel observations. Labour Force Survey, Statistical
Office of the Republic of Serbia
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of the 2000s it was no smaller in size but its structure had taken a dramatic turn for
the worse, as had its exposure to discrimination and poverty. If this had been a
sector of voluntary ‘exit’ at the beginning of the decade, by its end it had become
predominantly a sector of ‘exclusion’ (cf. Oviedo et al. 2009).
Findings about the volume, structure, and features of informal employment are
of great importance in designing economic and social policies aimed at tackling the
shadow economy. Data available from the Labour Force Survey, as well as deeper
research based on various sources that we have presented in brief, indicate that
informal employment is today primarily the last refuge of those forced out of the
formal economy during the transition and traditionally excluded groups. Conse-
quently, when developing and implementing measures to formalise informal
employment, incentives should take precedence over sanctions.
Why did we need this brief summary of the development of the shadow economy
in Serbia? It was needed because it serves as a reminder of the multi-faceted,
heterogeneous, and simultaneously stubborn, deeply rooted nature of this phenom-
enon. In the early 1990s the shadow economy became an acceptable survival
mechanism for businesses, entrepreneurs, and households, in answer to the multiple
shocks that they faced. At the time, liberal economists mainly underlined the
positive role of neo-liberal economics in co-ordinating the market and fostering
entrepreneurship. Yet the shadow economy mangled the rules and institutions of the
market economy, incentivised corruption, and undermined fiscal morality and the
trust of the population in the state. In various forms, the entire society took part in
the shadow economy. For instance, the official foreign currency exchange rate
usually deviated from the market exchange rate, sometimes even by a multiple of
the official figure, but transactions in foreign currency nonetheless took place at the
market exchange rate.
The negative economic and social effects of the informal economy first became
an issue in the 2000s. Starting in 2001, the Ministry of Finance undertook periodical
publicity campaigns to raise the profile of tax compliance, particularly that accom-
panying the introduction of VAT and fiscal receipts. A survey recently carried out
by the Employers’ Association and the Association of Independent Trade Unions
confirmed that business entities generally viewed the informal economy in a
negative light.
However, as with many other areas of the economy, government authorities and
economic policymakers are yet to systematically tackle this issue. There is no clear
commitment or strategy to the fight against the shadow economy. The past decade
again saw permitted exceptions that damaged equality of the participants in the
formal market: for instance, ‘linking’ workers’ years of service to compensate for
unpaid contributions, cancelling back taxes and other arrears, and tolerating the
non-payment of social security contributions by public businesses. Socially owned
companies in restructuring even enjoyed, for a long period of time, formal statutory
protection from actions that might have led to their insolvency (under the latest
amendments to the Law on Privatisation, this protection is set to expire in
mid-2014), and were thus able to run up huge debts in unpaid employee contribu-
tions to social security funds. There were several waves of what is termed “linking
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employees’ years of service”, where the government pays staff contributions at
troubled companies—thereby attempting to sway public opinion, but also acting as
accessory to the undermining of fiscal morals. This practice of socialising costs, of
course, has a negative demonstration effect on employers who comply with all of
their statutory obligations to their staff. In other cases, objectively marginal from
the point of view of public interest, the state was extraordinarily efficient, even
brutal, when collecting certain dues (e.g., performance rights charges).
Serbia’s experience over a lengthy period of time demonstrates the shadow
economy’s distorting and negative effect on balanced economic growth, particu-
larly in times of economic crisis. Displacement and substitution effects dominate
employment trends. To paraphrase Gresham’s law, no net new jobs are created—
bad jobs just drive out the good ones.
Although current economic conditions are much more favourable than those that
prevailed during the last decade of the twentieth century, and the shadow economy
shows no signs of overflowing its admittedly broad and comfortable basin, it poses
at least a threefold challenge to economic policymakers. Firstly, it directly hurts
public finances and often threatens public safety and health. Secondly, it is a
symptom of institutional weakness and an unfavourable business environment,
which jeopardises long-term growth. Thirdly, although it may at first sight seem
to serve as a refuge for vulnerable groups, the shadow economy is in reality a trap,
perpetuating instead of eliminating their poverty and exclusion.
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